Signals passed at Danger (SPADs)

Definition

This measure reports all Category A SPADs. This indicates the signals passed while displaying a stop aspect for intrusions into a non permitted route, which can lead to collision when a stop aspect or indication was displayed correctly, in sufficient time for the train to be stopped at the signal. 

Results

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Commentary
 
Since the introduction of Train Protection Warning System (TPWS) in 2002/03, the risk from Category ‘A’ Signals Passed at Danger (SPAD) has reduced by around 90%. However, following a year-on-year reduction in the actual number of SPADs, there has been a slight increase in the annual number of SPADs in the last two years.

Notwithstanding this, the total number of SPADs remains at a low level, although the total for 2007/08 is 6.3% higher than the previous year.  During the initial part of the year the moving annual average continued to fall, and for 8 of the 13 periods was within the target level set.  The comparatively high number of SPADs in Periods 12 and 13 compared to the low number in the equivalent period in the previous year has led to a rise in the moving annual average at the end of the year.  This is the second consecutive year in which the overall SPAD numbers have increased following seven years of improvement.

The industry is currently considering the impact of a number of factors on SPAD performance, including:

• the focus of risk management diverted from SPAD risk towards other risks
• TPWS potentially being regarded as a ‘safety net’ and could be modifying driver behaviour
• an increased number of TPWS reset and continue events, whereby a train driver, following activation of the TPWS on-train equipment,  may have reset the equipment and continued moving the train forward without firstly speaking to the signaller 

Specific actions/initiatives that are being taken to reduce Category ‘A’ SPAD risk are:

• adoption of local initiatives within area Operations Risk and Mitigation (OPSRAM) groups to address site specific SPAD related issues through selected improvement initiatives
• continued reporting and analysis of all SPAD incidents, following through investigations at the appropriate level and addressing any recommendations that are generated as a result
• a continuing programme of signalling renewal schemes where opportunity is being taken to bring the signalling equipment and installation up to the latest design and implementation standards to minimise SPAD risk. This includes utilisation of new technology to optimise the visibility of signals (e.g. LED signal heads), consideration of the layout features and optimisation of TPWS installations
• sharing of best practice through the national Operations Focus Group and other industry forums. These involve a variety of stakeholders including Network Rail, Railway Safety & Standards Board and Train/Freight Operating Companies.

These efforts will continue, in conjunction with additional train operator led initiatives, over the next year where it is anticipated further benefit can be gained in order to attain the target level set.